Balancing the National Guard’s Role in Disasters
February 14, 2009
By Michael Barrick
With a new administration in the White House reviewing our nation’s plans for responding to man-made or natural disasters, the role of the U.S. National Guard will undoubtedly be reviewed. While the 2006 congressional study of Hurricane Katrina – A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina – revealed a startling lack of collaboration and leadership at all levels, it also revealed the readiness of the U.S. National Guard to be a bright spot. However, readiness does not ensure a proper response. Though that ended up being the case during Katrina, the National Guard clearly has a role to play in natural disasters. However, its role must be balanced against the nation’s historical principle that “all disasters begin and end locally.” In short, the Guard must be put to its highest and best use, but not be asked or allowed to cross the line of civilian control of disaster response and recovery.
The greatest strength of the Guard – its disciplined methods and force – turned to be its greatest liability during the response to Hurricane Katrina. However, the blame does not rest with the National Guard or its leaders, for it was ready to deploy; rather civilian authorities charged with understanding its role within the National Response Plan (now the National Response Framework) and with the responsibility for activating the National Guard simply failed to utilize this tremendous asset in a timely manner.
There is no question that the National Guard’s primary mission is to be ready to deploy to combat theaters. “The current heavy reliance on the Army National Guard for oversees operations represents a fundamental change from the Guard’s planned role as a strategic reserve force whose principle role was to deploy in the later stages of a major conflict, if needed” (GAO report, 2005). Yet, despite this primary mission, and even with civil authorities seemingly making questionable decisions regarding the legitimate and legal use of military assets, the National Guard eventually fulfilled its role in the greatest natural catastrophe of our time. In short, the systems were ostensibly in place that would have allowed for a quick, coordinated response by the National Guard – whether operating under the orders of the President or Gulf Coast Governors – if civilian leadership would have been more proactive in calling upon these resources.
While Katrina is but one natural disaster, its scope was so significant as to allow ample opportunities for learning lessons and applying them. First, though, a review of what the National Guard did right in responding to Hurricane Katrina points to the assets that it – and it alone – brings to the tool box of disaster preparedness and response. The Air National Guard rescued 85 civilians from Gulfport, Mississippi in what Lt. Gen. Daniel James III, the Director of the Air National Guard called, “the largest military airlift operation supporting disaster relief in the United States” (A Failure of Initiative, 2006). Additionally, National Guard units provided search and rescue operations, hauled cargo such as sand bags, provided emergency medical treatment and supplied assistance for trauma surgeries. It also patrolled areas subject to looting or unrest, manned checkpoints, supported local law enforcement, provided assistance to those with special needs, and provided security at the Superdome (A Failure of Initiative, 2006). It also provided logistical support to FEMA and provided high-clearance vehicles and helicopters to aid evacuation efforts.
Still, the ill-coordinated response to Hurricane Katrina by all levels of government has forced a reexamination of the role of the National Guard in disaster response within the United States. Before considering the conclusions from the untold number of assessments of the response to Hurricane Katrina, it is instructive to look at a recent event – Hurricane Ike. Evidence suggests that lessons have been learned. According to the U.S. Northern Command website, the response to Ike included dozens of search and rescue missions, the deployment of the USS Nassau to Galveston, the coordination of relief supplies, pre-positioning of equipment and supplies, and logistical support (USNORTHCOM News). Indeed, the effective use of pre-positioned supplies is a tremendous improvement from the response to Hurricane Katrina. “By the time Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, the military was positioned to response with both National Guard and federal forces” (GAO Katrina report, 2006). Yet, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and others who could and should have asked for those resources did not do so until well after landfall. The failure to use these resources effectively during Hurricane Katrina is just one example of the challenges facing the National Guard when it is called upon to provide disaster assistance. Because they were deployed but not utilized, commanders lacked situational awareness and were hence hampered in identifying the most critical assets requiring deployment. Another challenge is that a large percentage of National Guardsmen are presently deployed oversees. The draw-down of equipment being utilized in the battle fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan is also having a negative effect. “…states are concerned about the Guard’s ability to perform future domestic missions given its declining equipment status” (GAO Katrina report, 2006).
Also, as Banks has noted, the Department of Defense does not wish to have an expanded role in domestic disaster relief. Echoing this sentiment is Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale, who wrote, “…striking the appropriate balance between the military’s primary warfighting role overseas and the need to support civilian authorities at home is a difficult, but fundamental issue” (GAO Katrina report, 2006).
Conclusion
One finding in “A Failure of Initiative” is debatable. In it, the authors stated, “The most important limit to the military’s ability to manage domestic disaster response is the nation’s traditional reliance on local control to handle incident response.” Essentially, the authors are stating that the problem is systematic. However, none of the other reports supports this conclusion. What they do support is that the people responsible for implementing the systems failed to exercise their roles. Communications breakdowns, bureaucratic layering, turf battles, political considerations, and flat-out incompetence ruled the day. Until each and every system that failed is tested in a manner to allow it to function as intended, it is premature to abandon our firmly-held principle of local and civilian control even while we still utilize the Guard as only it can be. Ultimately, the failures during Hurricane Katrina were caused by responsible parties failing to do what was required of them – to imagine the worst and to prepare for it.
© The Barrick Report and Emergency Preparedness Today, 2009. Contact the author at mbarrick@charter.net.
