Lessons from Hurricane Evacuations

By Michael Barrick

Following the wave of hurricanes that overwhelmed the United States Gulf Coast during the late summer of 2005, and out of concern for the need to have effective plans in place to evacuate urban populations in the event of a terrorist attack, the U.S. Department of Transportation, in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted an assessment of the hurricane evacuation plans in the five Gulf Coast states – Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas.

While evacuating urban areas is a real possibility as long as the nation remains at war, it is the Gulf Coast states that have the actual experience of evacuating entire cities, counties and regions. While many mistakes have been exposed during these evacuations, so too have many lessons been learned. However, before a community can apply these lessons to improve their own plans, it is imperative that we first have an understanding of who is responsible for the decisions leading to an evacuation, and what agencies and organizations are essential for support of the operations developed and implemented by the decision-makers.

Primary Responsibility

As with virtually any natural disaster in the United States, the decision to evacuate a community during a disaster is made by emergency management officials at the local level. However, because of the size and scope – not to mention the unpredictable nature of hurricanes – it is folly to think that only local officials could make such a decision. They can not operate independently of adjacent communities that would be impacted by the storm, nor can they act independently of communities that would be receiving evacuees or have them moving through their communities on to safer venues. So, while it is a local decision, it is one that involves more than one locality, and requires input from multiple levels of government, functions, private entities and non-government organizations (NGOs). Ultimately, however, it is up to the emergency manager in each community who, by state statute is the appropriate designee, to make the final decision.

Support for Decision Making

The official that must ultimately be the one person accountable for making the decision to evacuate in face of an approaching hurricane is well-served to call upon as many resources as possible before he or she reaches the “Hurricane Evacuation Decision Time” (Patterson, Tutorial 1.3). Some key partners that the emergency manager will want to call upon include meteorologists with the National Weather Service; transportation officials; emergency response agencies, in particular police because of the need for safety and control; the American Red Cross and other NGOs; and peers in neighboring communities. However, others – while not involved in the initial phases of an evacuation – must also be consulted.

The clearest proof of this are the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) established under the National Response Framework (NRF). A listing of those functions guides the emergency manager. In short, virtually every one of these 15 functions would be involved in some stage of the evacuation, whether it is preparedness, mitigation, response or recovery. So, the emergency manager should keep in close contact with officials at the local, state and federal level which contribute to each of these functions so that the manager will have a greater level of situational awareness regarding how his or her decision to evacuate will impact not only the population evacuating, but also the agencies providing those functions. In short, are these agencies fully informed and prepared to support the evacuating population?

Top Improvements

Choosing which improvements are the “top two” is difficult because while the plans have been assessed, the implementation of them have not been (though the After Action Reports that are presently being generated in response to the hurricane season of 2008 should soon provide such insight). So, in considering the top improvements in hurricane evacuations discovered through this congressional study, I considered two primary measures. First, which areas have the greatest impact upon morbidity and mortality? Second, which areas allowed for the greatest room for improvement? Considering the five areas that the report identified as the weakest areas of evacuation plans and processes – public communications, serving special needs populations, planning, operations, and sheltering – I considered the subsets in each category as they related to the two measures noted above. The greatest weakness under operations and planning – contraflow (getting people back home after the event) was eliminated as a potential top improvement because it simply does not have a high potential for impacting morbidity and mortality. Under sheltering, the main problem was with animals. Again, this is not a primary concern under that first measure.

Consequently, improvements in public communications and meeting the needs of special populations are the two areas I have identified as why these are the areas which must show – and have shown – the most improvement. That is because improvements in these areas have the greatest potential to reduce morbidity and mortality.

Evidence

So, if assessments are incomplete, how can one state that public communications and meeting special needs populations are the two areas showing the greatest improvement?

First, the “Findings and Recommendations” (Congressional Report) support my conclusions regarding the areas impacting morbidity and mortality. Second, as a result, these two areas have current corrective actions in place, some of which I have personal experience with in my position as an emergency manager. The study reports that “three crosscutting issues…emerged from the study” (page 5-1). First mentioned is the lack of local coordination. This is a communications issue. Second is that evacuation plans do “not adequately address…those with special needs” (page 5-1). Finally, the two intersect in the third finding. “…plans for communicating essential information to those who do not have…special needs generally are not well developed” (page 5-1).

Still, how can one claim that these deficiencies are areas of greatest improvement? First, one can presume that the areas identified as the greatest weaknesses and threats will receive the most attention. Second, corrective actions are in place for these areas. On August 1, 2008, our facility participated in a regional DHS Full Scale Exercise which tested, as key objectives, evacuation plans and responding to special needs populations. Furthermore, The Joint Commission, DHS and other regulatory bodies have made these two areas key focal points for current assessments of emergency management plans for communities and hospitals. Unquestionably, such scrutiny will lead to rapid and measurable improvements in these areas.

Conclusion

Until these plans are more fully tested, and until comprehensive After Action Reports from the 2008 hurricane season (which is not yet over at the time of this writing) are completed, we can speculate that the two areas identified – communications and meeting special needs – are showing the most improvements based on the evidence above. However, further assessments must be conducted and ongoing to validate these claims. Finally, it is arguable that whatever steps are taken will be incomplete, because coastal communities and the nation seem reluctant at this point to take the most obviously beneficial mitigation step – regulating and limiting further coastal development.

References

“Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation: A Report to Congress.” U.S. Department of Transportation, 1 June, 2006.

Patterson, Chip. “Hurricane Evacuation Decision Making” lectures. University of North Carolina. HPM 423.

© The Barrick Report and Emergency Preparedness Today,  2009. Contact the author at mbarrick@charter.net.