The Major Flaw in the New National Response Framework

FEMA should stand alone

By Michael Barrick

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently released the National Response Framework (NRF), the manual replacing the National Response Plan (NRP). The NRF is essentially a blueprint for how the nation and its communities will respond to disasters. According to the Fact Sheet distributed along with the news release announcing the new NRF, five principles guide the NRF – engaged partnerships; tiered response; scalable, flexible and adaptable operational capabilities; unity of effort through unified command; and readiness to act.

Well, it sounds reasonable enough in theory. However, a closer reading reveals a major flaw. The Fact Sheet also claims, “The National Response Framework is a guide that details how the Nation conducts an all-hazards approach.” This is the flaw of the NRF. It will not utilize a true “All-Hazards” approach any more than the replaced NRP did. Why? Because the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) remains under the control of the DHS, which it was integrated into on March 1, 2003.

Consequently, the DHS continues to ignore the key lessons we should have learned from Hurricane Katrina. The lesson – the nation’s “All Hazards” approach is a misnomer. DHS has been focused almost exclusively on terrorism, while our nation’s communities are more likely to experience emergencies caused by natural disasters, man-made events and infrastructure deterioration.

FEMA should stand alone. Not all emergencies are homeland security issues. DHS funding decisions since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are the best evidence that the DHS has not truly employed the “All Hazards” approach. From New York to villages in the Appalachians and sparsely-populated states in the Western U.S., money has gone to equipment and supplies primarily geared towards terrorism. This approach, weighted heavily and inappropriately towards terrorist threats, has robbed communities of not only desperately needed resources for more realistic and common hazards, but has also distracted our focus. While all levels of government should not ignore the reality that we are at war, history and experience have proven that natural disasters, man-made events and infrastructure challenges will dominate our emergency preparations and responses.

Consequently, the NRF is just as likely to fail as the NRP. FEMA must be removed from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In doing so, DHS could apply the “All Hazards” approach in the context of war and FEMA could apply it in the context of realistic hazards for which it is more suited to plan for and respond to. State and local governments should continue working with both agencies in an integrated fashion to ensure interoperability, but should also be free to focus on more common hazards.

Proof of this is how the NRP and the people responsible for implementing it failed to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. Though countless words have been written about the response to and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by journalists and all levels of government, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina offers the most comprehensive and compelling evidence that the National Response Plan (NRP) was an abject failure in meeting the needs of the citizens impacted by Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana (as well as Mississippi, Alabama and those areas to which residents were evacuated and relocated). More precisely and accurately, however, it was not the plan that failed. Rather, it was the people charged with implementing the plan that failed. There is no reason to believe that this would change with the NRF for two reasons. First, because of the continued inclusion of FEMA under the DHS; and also because of the government’s reluctance to hold people accountable for failure – regardless of what plan or framework under which they operate.

Hence, we must consider the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina from not only a systematic perspective, but also with a critical view of the failure of people to do their jobs to protect and save lives and property. While the congressional report cited above points to numerous shortcomings, virtually all of them can be traced to the failure of emergency preparedness officials to embrace the fundamentals of emergency preparedness as outlined in the NRP. There is nothing in the new NRF to make one think that a “new” framework will change that.

The NRP was a failure because the people charged with knowing and implementing it failed to utilize it as designed. Though it is characterized as being “always in effect,” it clearly was not. And, the respective governments responsible for knowing and implementing the NRP essentially failed to hold individuals accountable (with a few notable exceptions).

As a result, the national morale was and remains severely harmed. That will not change until we acknowledge that FEMA should not have been integrated into DHS and should be immediately separated from it.

Evidence of the NRP being essentially ignored is overwhelming. A fundamental precept of emergency planning and management is that there are four areas of emergency planning – mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Steps that could have been taken to mitigate the impact of the storm were not. Those charged with preparedness essentially stood on the sidelines, waiting for landfall. Consequently, response efforts were severely hampered. Recovery is ongoing. That the 9^th Ward of New Orleans still today looks like Katrina blew through yesterday, and the fact that tens of thousands of families remain sheltered in mobile homes are two startling examples of failed recovery efforts.

The NRP called for coordination among all jurisdictional levels, flexibility in response, and for emergency officials to anticipate a threat. None of these things occurred as the plan required. The NRP had called for all levels of response and recovery agencies to implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Many had not. Those that had were dealing with officials completely unfamiliar with its structures and purpose.

Evacuation orders were issued far too late and private agencies, such as hospitals, were left to stand alone for days without utility services in stifling conditions in the midst of civil unrest. Healthcare workers and hospitals are still being sued by families convinced that their family members died needlessly – and perhaps even at the hands of those charged to protect and preserve them – because conditions were so horrendous and dangerous that nothing these healthcare workers learned in school or through years of practice could have prepared them for the conditions in which they found themselves.

So, indeed, the first three words of the congressional study – “A Failure of Initiative” – point to the root cause of these multiple failures. In short, the system failed because people failed.

How then, should we respond?

People must be held accountable. Complacency and mediocrity are the inevitable result of the generic “mistakes were made.” Lessons learned are meaningless if those responsible for making the mistakes escape the consequences of their inaction or incompetence. This is a tendency that must be eliminated. Where people fail to do their jobs, we can react in one of two ways. First, we can conclude that those responsible have learned their lessons and have become stronger and better prepared as a result, and hence should be retained and allowed the opportunity to demonstrate they can be entrusted with future risks. In some cases, however, it must be acknowledged that the mistakes or negligence were so egregious as to rise to the level of “dereliction of duty.” In those cases, people must be removed to prevent further loss of life in future events, and to serve as an example that some errors are so great that if those charged with protecting citizens don’t do as required of them, they lose their jobs – and may even be prosecuted.

Corrective Action Plans require responsible parties, as well as clearly articulated expectations and deadlines. Without ownership and follow-up, no actions will be taken. Training and repetitive drilling is essential. People must learn systems and learn cooperation. That can’t be done in the absence of training, drilling and networking.

Until FEMA is removed from the DHS, no plan, framework or any proposal – regardless of the name – will ensure that those responsible for protecting the lives and property of Americans, whatever the threat, will succeed.

© The Barrick Report, 2008. To contact the author, write mbarrick@charter.net

Retiring ‘Bubba’: The Imperative for Professional Emergency Managers through National Accreditation

By Michael Barrick

In late 1973, at the age of 17, I worked my first shift on an ambulance in rural Doddridge County, W.Va. As the fates would have it, before I had even completed my training as an Emergency Medical Technician, I was faced with the prospect of delivering a baby. Fortunately, mom had been there – seven times before. So, she guided me and my equally green partner (and best friend) through the process.

Much has changed in the passing 35 years. The world in which we live is far more complicated and clearly more dangerous. Consequently, just as I was over my head in the back of that ambulance then, so too are many within the Emergency Management sector today. This is not an indictment of folks who I classify collectively as “Bubba.” Rather, several factors – rapid technological change, systems thinking, media savvy, public policy, political pressures, decision-making skills, and a world that does not have the luxury for turf battles – demand that we abandon the old ways of preparing for and responding to disasters, whether natural or man-made.

That means that it is time to retire “Bubba” and replace him with expertly trained emergency managers through National Accreditation.

Just recently, Chairman Arnold Punaro of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves told the Associated Press that roughly 90 percent of the National Guard and Reserve units in the United States are not prepared for an attack upon the United States homeland. Commenting upon this frightening scenario, Punaro said, “…in the world we live in – you’re either ready or you’re not.”[1]

The same is true with Emergency Management. While some efforts have been made to address this deficiency – most notably the establishment of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) – much work remains. Consequently, it is imperative that steps be taken immediately to increase the professionalism of emergency managers through formal education, specialized training, professional certification and salaries commiserate with the heady responsibilities essential for leading all levels of government to prepare for and respond to disasters as the American public has come to expect and deserve. A glaring example – the response to Hurricane Katrina – only underscores this need.

Claire B. Rubin addresses both the deficiencies in current emergency management practices, and more importantly, the challenges facing the field which have created the deficiencies. Speaking to the most notable change in our lifetime – the rise of Al Qaeda – Rubin notes, “Unfortunately, their brand of terrorism is likely to plague the world for generations.”[2] Additionally, she noted the challenge of finding the proper niche for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), saying, “…problems with implementation of the programs and activities of DHS will probably provide topics for research and discussion for decades.”[3] Noting that public health officials, in particular the U.S. Centers for Disease Control also face new challenges, Rubin acknowledged, “…the growing importance of the health and medical aspects of threats and disasters along with the essential need for the emergency management community to create or improve working relationships with their health and medical counterparts.”[4] In short, as she noted, “The relationship between homeland security and emergency management remains to be worked out at every level of government.”[5]

These challenges can only be addressed by a cadre of professionally trained emergency managers. Why? The reasons are numerous. Because emergency management agencies are largely political entities, the ability to negotiate the intricacies of political debates and turf battles requires people with the skills to negotiate the political process while relentlessly fighting for resources, assets and flexibility. Otherwise, we will remain as our military is now – not ready! As noted, flexibility is essential because circumstances are changing so rapidly. Our representative “Bubba” is generally inflexible. A rapidly changing environment requires constant education. So, people responsible for emergency management must be able to manage their jobs while also being willing to constantly train and learn. Again, those resistant to change will fail in this environment. The advent of NIMS demands a change in thinking – both among first responders and first receivers, such as hospitals. This requires systems thinking and problem-solving skills that are not dogmatic. Management by Objectives demands adaptability. Those who won’t change as circumstances warrant present a danger to the public they wish to serve.

Turf battles must end. The first and most important characteristic of a leader is a servant nature and attitude. While a leader must be willing to “take charge,” he or she must also be willing to share power and knowledge. Those accustomed to holding on to knowledge because it means they hold on to power put the public at risk.

The emergency managers of the future – of now, really – must embrace strategic thinking and systems approaches. They must demonstrate the ability to learn quickly and discard old thinking when proven to be outdated. They must be able to learn and utilize the latest technology. They must understand the role of the media and be able to communicate through them without developing an adversarial tone. They must understand legal issues, to embrace life-long learning, and make quick decisions without expecting a medal for simply doing their job.

All of this means that it is time to retire “Bubba.” Otherwise, we’ll be waiting for his funeral. If we do, we are risking that our own funerals may be held at the same time.

© Michael Barrick, 2008.

NOTES

1. “Military unready for homeland attack, says study,” Associated Press, 2 February 2008 [Online] <http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/02/01/guarding.america.ap/index.html>

2. Claire B. Rubin, “Emergency Management in the 21^st Century: Dealing with Al Qaeda, Tom Ridge and Julie Gerberding,” “The George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management” and “The Natural Hazards Center, the University of Colorado, Boulder,” May, 2004, p. 3.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid, p. 4.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Military unready for homeland attack, says study.” [Online]. Associated Press, 2 February 2008.

Rubin, Claire B. “Emergency Management in the 21^st Century: Dealing with Al Qaeda, Tom Ridge and Julie Gerberding.” “The George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management” and “The Natural Hazards Center, the University of Colorado, Boulder.” May, 2004.